Republished with permission from
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
|
Securing XP Desktops:Controlling Local Use and Network Accessby David M. Piscitello, President, Core Competence, Inc. Spend even a short time investigating computer and network security, and you'll encounter the acronym AAA. AAA stands for authentication, authorization, and accounting:
In a companion article, I presented ways to create user accounts and implement auditing on systems running Windows XP Professional Edition, by using the Local Security Policy editor. In today's article, we explore ways to exercise control over what local computer and network resources users may access, using XP's Group Policy Object Editor. When (and why)
|
|
Policy |
Dave's Setting |
When and Why? |
|
Access this computer from the network |
Administrators, Users |
Determines what groups can use SMB, CIFS, NetBIOS, HTTP and COM+. This setting prevents the use of Guest and Anonymous user accounts as attack vectors. |
|
Allow logon through Terminal Services |
Administrators (Helpdesk group), or No one |
Determines what groups can remotely access the local machine. Restrict this to administrators unless you use Remote Assistance to assist users from a Help Desk. If you don't use Terminal Services, disallow it entirely. |
|
Bypass traverse checking |
Users |
Restrict this to users to prevent Guest and Anonymous user accounts from accessing restricted files and folders. |
|
Change the system time |
Administrators |
System time is critical for maintaining accurate auditing. Only administrators should change time. |
|
Debug programs |
No one |
Restrict this to prevent unauthorized access to OS components through debugger programs. Only developers need this privilege, and even then, only in the context of their individual account, which is enabled by default. |
|
Force shutdown from a remote system and Shut down the system |
Administrators |
Restrict access to the shutdown process to prevent a malicious user from denying service to legitimate local machine users. |
|
Log on locally |
Administrators, Users |
Restrict logon to authorized users and admins to prevent access via Guest accounts. |
|
Profile single process |
Administrators |
With this privilege, a user can monitor nonsystem processes (e.g., applications), which falls into the "information gathering" category. Only allow admins this privilege. |
|
Restore files and
directories and Backup files and directories |
Administrators |
Determines whether a user can override permissions and restore or backup files and directories. Both operations can be misused. You may want to allow this privilege for laptop users who are savvy enough to recover from a system problem or data loss while on the road. |
An explanation about the "No one" security setting: configure this by enabling a security setting, then removing all groups from the policy.
If you open the Local Security Policy Editor (Run => secpol.msc) and navigate to User Rights Assignments, you'll find the same list of policies you see from the Group Policy Object Editor. Changes at this level affect individual user accounts, giving you the ability to increase or further restrict policy for a specific user. My experience is that "one-off" exceptions to group policies always come back to haunt me. They are hard to isolate, are most likely to be poorly documented, and can usually be avoided by creating another group policy, even if that policy applies to a single individual.
Exercising control over user access rights to networks and computers is a complementary security process to creating accounts and auditing users through these electronic identities. Several methods exist to implement such controls when running Windows XP Professional on user computers. Microsoft is under constant scrutiny and doggedly criticized for a perceived lack of attention to security in its products. Some of this criticism is earned. On any system, I object to configuration defaults that facilitate exploits, and I'd love to have a "secure vs. ease of use defaults" choice when purchasing a Windows PC. But that's not the hand we are currently dealt.
The practical response is not to whine and carp, but to accept that every system administrator (and user) must accept responsibility and accountability for configuring for security. You can grump at Microsoft, or you can measurably improve Windows XP Professional through the Local and Group Policy Object Editors. Is it fair that you should have to do this work? Not really. Is it effective? Yes. ##
Windows XP Security Guide: Securing XP Clients
UK Security Online: Windows XP -- Home User Self-Defence
Ways to Open the Group Policy Editor
Microsoft Technet: To open Group Policy Object Editor as an MMC snap-in
Copyright© 2004, WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. WatchGuard, LiveSecurity, Firebox and ServerLock are trademarks or registered trademarks of WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
Copyright © 1996 - 2004
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. |